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Introduction
The last decade has been characterized by the well-known Great Recession which caused a substantial increase in …nancial instability. 1 In 2008, the G20 committed to a broad range of policy reforms that addressed the major fault lines that caused the crisis. At the same time, many Governments introduced …scal stimulus packs aimed mainly at stimulating investment during the recession.
Over the last two decades, a part of the relevant literature has been studying the e¤ects of taxation on …rms'choices, thereby analyzing the interactions between …nancial and start-up decisions in a dynamic context (with or without complete information). 2 Other articles have focused on the neutrality properties of taxation in a real-option setting, 3 as well as the non-linear tax e¤ects on investment (e.g., Gries et al., 2012) . Despite the growing interest in these topics, only Mauer and Ott (1995) have analyzed the e¤ects of tax depreciation allowances on investment decisions. However, they only focused on an equity-…nanced investment, thereby disregarding default risk. 4 In this article we aim to study the e¤ects of tax depreciations allowances on both real and …nancial decisions. In particular, we will focus on a representative …rm that can decide when to invest and how much to borrow, under default risk. This joint analysis allows us to understand the e¤ects of accelerated depreciation allowances in a risky environment. Given the capital structure of a …rm, it is straightforward to show that accelerated depreciation stimulates investment. This means that, due to the tax bene…t, a …rm decides to invest with a lower initial EBIT. Coeteris paribus however, 1 As stressed by Bhamra et al. (2010) , there is a link between …rms'capital structure and systemic risk. In particular, they …nd that leverage accounts for most of the macroeconomic risk relevant for predicting defaults. Another interesting article is Keen et al. (2010) , which studies the relationship between taxation and the …nancial crisis. In particular, the authors stress the fact that tax distortions did not cause the …nancial crisis. However, they led to higher leverage and more complexity, with some negative drawbacks. 2 Moretto and Panteghini (2007) and Panteghini (2007a,b) . 3 See, for example, Niemann (1999) and Niemann and Sureth (2005) . 4 Danielova and Sarkar (2012) study the e¤ects of investment incentives and tax incentives. They show that when debt …nancing is possible, it is generally optimal to use a combination of tax reduction and investment subsidy. However, they do not investigate tax e¤ects on the default risk and, therefore, disregard systemic risk. a lower EBIT implies a higher probability of default. If this is true, accelerated depreciation may cause an increase in bankruptcies and thus lead to higher systemic risk. Our model shows that, using realistic parameter values, accelerated depreciation delays the event of default. This result has an interesting policy implication: generous tax depreciation allowances are expected to stimulate investment without increasing systemic risk.
The structure of this article is as follows. In Section 2, we develop a continuous-time model describing a representative …rm that can decide both investment timing and the leverage ratio. Since the relationship between investment and …nancial choices is non-linear, we cannot …nd a closed-form solution. For this reason, Section 3 provides a numerical analysis. Section 4 summarizes our …ndings and discusses their policy implications.
The model
In this section we introduce an EBIT-based model in the spirit of Goldstein et al. (2001) .
Let us assume that a company starts to earn an EBIT, denoted by t , once a depreciable investment cost I has been paid. Moreover, we introduce the following:
Assumption 1 A …rm's EBIT evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion, where is the instantaneous standard deviation and dz t is the increment of a standard Wiener process. Moreover, at any time t there is a probability dt that the existing project dies during the short internal dt.
Given Assumption 1, a …rm's EBIT evolves as follows:
where dq t is the increment of a Poisson process with arrival rate . Under eq. (1), therefore, the expected lifetime of an investment project is …nite, although uncertain. As shown by Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 270 ), the expected time until the Poisson jump occurs is E (T ) = 1= . For simplicity, below we will omit the time variable.
Capital markets and debt Let us assume that risk is fully diversi…able, credit markets are perfectly competitive and information is symmetric. Debt causes both costs and bene…ts. On the one hand, debt …nance may lead to default. On the other, the tax deductibility of interest payments ensures levered companies a saving (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Leland, 1994) .
When a company does not meet its debt obligation, default takes place. In this case, shareholders are expropriated by the lender. Denoting C as the coupon paid to the lender, we introduce the following: Assumption 2 At time 0, the company issues a consol bond and pays a coupon C, which is not renegotiable.
According to Assumption 2 a company sets a coupon. Given C it is straightforward to …nd the mark-to-market value of debt. For simplicity, we also assume that debt cannot be renegotiated: this means that we apply a static model, where a company's …nancial policy cannot be reviewed later. 5 Assumption 3 If drops to a threshold value, default occurs.
Assumption 4
The cost of default is C with > 0.
Assumptions 3 and 4 introduce the risk and the cost of default, respectively. Given (1), it is assumed that, if a company's EBIT falls to a given threshold value, the company cannot meet its obligation and is fully expropriated by the lender (Assumption 3). In the event of default, the lender faces a sunk cost, which is proportional to the coupon paid (Assumption 4). 6 Taxation Let us next focus on the tax system. Given the corporate tax rate , we introduce the following:
Assumption 5 Interest payments are fully deductible.
Assumption 6 A straight-line tax depreciation allowance, equal to F times the investment cost I, is granted throughout the investment's lifetime.
Assumption 7 Before default, the lender's tax rate is nil. After default, the lender becomes shareholder and the relevant tax rate is .
Assumption 8 The tax system is fully symmetric.
Assumption 5 introduces the tax bene…t of interest deductibility. 7 Assumption 6 describes a simple straight-line …scal depreciation allowance which is granted throughout the investment's lifetime. When the project dies, this deduction vanishes. To analyze the expected present value of such depreciation allowance we must consider that the expected lifetime of an investment project is E (T ) = 1= . We can therefore say that, at any time t, a company can deduct F I, thereby enjoying a bene…t equal to F I: If the equality F = holds, depreciation allowances are such that all the investment costs are expected to be amortized during a …rm's lifetime. If F > , …scal depreciation allowance is more generous than economic depreciation (in this case more than 100% of I is amortized). The converse is true if F < . Assumption 7 accounts for the fact that, in most cases, the tax burden on capital income is relatively low or even close to zero. In this model, the lender's tax rate is equal to zero for simplicity. Note however that, after default, the lender becomes shareholder and is thus subject to corporate taxation. For simplicity, according to Assumption 8, the treatment of pro…t and loss is symmetric. 8 Given these assumptions we can write a company's after-tax payo¤ as:
Let us next calculate the value of equity and debt, respectively. Using dynamic programming, we can write the value of equity as the sum between the after-tax payo¤ received in the interval dt, i.e., N ( ; C) dt, and the value function after the time interval dt has passed: 9
after default,
where E [ ] is the expectation operator. As shown in (3), at any period dt, there is a probability dt that the project dies and that the value of equity goes to zero. Following the same procedure, we can calculate the mark-tomarket value of debt:
As can be seen, the value of debt is contingent on the event of sudden death of capital. Since there is a probability dt that a company's pro…t goes to zero, in this case, the lender's claim becomes worthless. This means that, given Assumption 1, debt …nancing is in line with the expected lifetime of investment. 10 Note that, by assuming this fact, we depart from most of the existing theoretical literature, which usually assumes that investment is …nanced only with default-free short-term debt, irrespective of a project's expected lifetime and riskiness (e.g., Devereux and Gri¢ th, 1999).
Debt …nance
In this section we introduce two di¤erent kinds of debt: secured and unsecured. 11 Using an EBIT-based model, we can say that:
De…nition 1 Under secured debt …nance, default occurs when falls to an exogenously given threshold point e s .
De…nition 2
Under unsecured debt …nance, the threshold point, denoted as e u , is chosen optimally by shareholders.
According to De…nition 1, default may be triggered when a company's EBIT falls to the exogenously given threshold point e s . This de…nition refers to secured debt, where default takes place when a company's asset value falls to the debt's value. 12 Under De…nition 2, when a company's net cash ‡ow is negative, shareholders can decide whether to inject further equity capital in order to meet their company's debt obligations or to default. As long as they issue new capital and pay the coupon, they can exploit a future recovery in pro…tability. Under unsecured debt …nance, therefore, shareholders behave as if they owned a put option, the exercise of which leads to default.
Let us next calculate the value of equity. Using (3), applying Itô's Lemma and rearranging gives the following non-arbitrage condition:
As can be seen, in equation (5) the relevant discount rate is r + instead of r. As explained by Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 200) , to deal with a stochastic decay of capital "we can regard the project as in…nite-live, but augment the rate at which future pro…ts are discounted by adding the Poisson death parameter". Solving (5) we obtain (see Appendix A):
with j = s; u and ( ; C)
is the present value of …scal depreciation allowances and 2 ( ) = 1
The term ( ; C) accounts for a scenario where no change occurs, apart from the future death of the project. As can be seen, the relevant discount rate for is + ; where is the so-called convenience (or dividend) yield. 13 The latter term measures the contingent value 12 As pointed out by Smith and Warner (1979, p. 127) "[s]ecuring debt gives bondholders title to pledged assets until the bonds are paid in full". 13 If shareholders are risk neutral, in equilibrium we have = r > 0. If however they are risk-averse, the dividend yield is > r (see Siegel, 1984 and 1985) .
of default. In particular, = e j 2 ( ) measures the present value of 1 Euro contingent on the default event, and e j ; C is the expected present value of the pro…t lost by shareholders after expropriation. As can be seen, an increase in raises current in ‡ows and reduces the probability of default. This means that the value of equity is positively a¤ected by the current value of .
Given these results, we can now calculate the default threshold points under secured and unsecured debt, respectively.
Secured debt According to De…nition 1, full debt protection means that the default threshold point e s must be such that we have N e s ; C = 0: Using (2) gives: e s = C 1 F I:
As can be seen, the higher the tax depreciation rate F , the lower the threshold level e s . Of course, this leads to a delay of default.
Unsecured debt To calculate the threshold value under unsecured debt we follow Leland (1994) . Accordingly, e u is obtained by maximizing the value of equity, i.e., max
Solving problem (8) (see Appendix B), we obtain:
Like the secured-debt case, the higher the tax depreciation rate F , the lower the threshold level e s is. Moreover, the inequality e u < e s holds. This result can be explained as follows: under unsecured debt …nance, a company can inject equity in order to meet its debt obligations. This means that, unlike the secured-debt …nance case, a company can postpone default. This means that contingent cost of default is higher under unsecured debt, i.e.,
8 @ e s @ F : This means that the e¤ect of F on the contingent evaluation of future events crucially depends on the characteristics of debt. Following the same procedure, we can now calculate the value of debt. As shown in Appendix D, we obtain:
(10) Function (10) shows that the value of debt depends not only on C but also on the current value of . If > e j , the value of debt consists of two terms: a perpetual rent and a term that is non-linear in . In this case, an increase in reduces the probability of default and therefore raises the value of debt. As can be seen, the lender's relevant discount rate is r + : this means that the expected lifetime of debt (until default) is in line with the expected lifetime of investment. The second term measures the contingent value of the net cost of default. After default (i.e., when has reached e j ), the lender becomes shareholder and the value of his/her company is equal to h
In this case, the …rm is fully equity-…nanced and its value is positively a¤ected by .
Using (6) and (10) we obtain the value of the levered …rm:
As can be seen, V j ( ; C) depends on both the tax rate and the default cost. Of course, it also accounts for the fact that, in the event of default, the tax bene…t of interest deductibility is lost.
The option to invest
Let us next focus on investment timing. We let a representative …rm decide when to invest a given amount of resources I. According to Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , this means that our representative …rm owns an investment option, with the following functional form:
where A 1 is an unknown to be determined and 1 = 1 15 In order to …nd the optimal investment timing, we also need to calculate a business'Net Present Value (NPV). Using (11) , the NPV will be equal to:
with j = s; u. Following Panteghini (2007b), a …rm's objective function will then be equal to 1 times the NPV, i.e.,
(12) with j = s; u. Term 1 measures the contingent value of 1 Euro, when < , which will be invested whenever = : Maximizing (12) with respect to gives the following …rst order condition @W j @ = Remember that our …rm can choose its capital structure. This means that it can optimally set the value of C. Again, di¤erentiating (12) with respect to C gives the following …rst order condition: 13) and (14) cannot be solved explicitly. This is due to the fact that both and F a¤ect not only a …rm's current payo¤, but also its contingent evaluation of future events (i.e., default and the project death). Therefore, the joint analysis of real and …nancial choices requires a numerical approach. 16 
A numerical analysis
Let us next focus on a numerical analysis aimed at studying the e¤ects of tax depreciation allowances. According to Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , for the benchmark case we assume r = 0:04 and = 0:20: these values are consistent with the empirical evidence (see, e.g., Jorion and Goetzman, 1999, and Dimson et al., 2002) . Moreover, we assume that the depreciation rate is either 0.03 or 0.10. 17 We also assume that the default cost is 5% of the …rm's value. 18 Tax depreciation 16 The optimal coupons under both secured and unsecured, namely, C u and C s ; are such that the inequality C u > C s holds. This is due to the fact that, under unsecured debt …nancing, a company can decide when to default. Given its higher …nancial ‡exibility, therefore, a company can choose a higher leverage ratio (see Panteghini, 2007b ). 17 The economic depreciation rate usually ranges from 0 to 0.10. This range is in line with the average depreciation rates reported in Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the United States, 1925-1989 (10% for equipment and 5% for structures) and is applied, for example, by Caballero and Engels (1999) . 18 It is worth noting that the value of may depend on several factors that make it range from 5% to 20% (see Panteghini, 2007b) . For this reason we ran simulations with di¤erent values of : However, the quality never changed. For this reason we simply use = 0:05 with no loss of generality.
allowances are equal to f + , where 2 [0:01; 0:09] is the additional bene…t due to generous depreciation allowances. Below, we will also carry out some sensitivity analyses regarding parameters and : So, will also be set equal to 0.4 in order to study the e¤ect of higher uncertainty. Finally, we will run our numerical analysis setting equal to either 0.2 or 0.3. In doing so, we account for recent tax cuts which have led many countries to apply a statutory tax rate between 20% and 30%. Tables 2 and 3 show the e¤ects of an increase in on C , and the expected time of default, E (T ), i.e., the time lag between investment and default, for equal to 0.2 and 0.3, respectively. 19 Under both secured and unsecured debt …nance, an increase in F reduces both C and . The decrease in the threshold level is not surprising: the more generous the tax depreciation allowance, the earlier an investment is made. Our results show that, due to the lower value of , it is optimal to reduce the optimal coupon. Otherwise, the default risk would be excessive. 20 Both Table 2 and 3 show that the expected default time is increasing in F for = 0; 1 and = 0:20; 0:30. It is worth noting that, with = 0:1, the expected lifetime of the investment project is 10 periods. As shown in Tables 2 and 3 the expected time of default E (T ) is almost always higher than 10. This means that, with a physiological standard deviation (i.e. = 0:2), default is a negligible event since the project is quite likely to die before. 19 We calculate this by extending the model described in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Dixit (1993) . 20 Coeteris paribus, the decrease in C reduces the probability of default at any time t. The converse is true when drops: the gap between and the default threshold point is reduced and therefore default is more likely. If the former e¤ect (on C ) dominates the latter (i.e., that on ), default is delayed. According to Tables 2 and 3 Note that, with a higher value of (i.e., 0.4 rather than 0.2), the expected default time is shorter and default may take place before the expected project death, under secured debt …nance (since E (T ) < 10). In any case however, E (T ) is always increasing in F . Tables 6 to 9 provide the numerical results with = 0:03. In this case, the expected lifetime of an investment project is much longer (i.e., 1=0:03 = 33:3). Since the …rm is expected to produce for longer time, the expected time of default is also longer. As can be seen in Table 6 , E (T ) is around 30 periods, under secured debt …nance and is much higher than 33:3 when debt is unsecured. In these cases, default is therefore a negligible event.
Similar …ndings are shown in Table 7 , i.e., when = 0:30; in this case, the inequality C > holds under unsecured debt …nance. Of course, this result 14 depends on the symmetric treatment of pro…ts and losses. When C > a …rm is making losses and, due to the generous tax depreciation allowances, it is highly subsidized. Though this is an unrealistic case, it is quite important since it highlights the fact that, even if investment were undertaken with an initial loss, tax depreciation allowances would still increase E (T ). We can thus say that, even under a system that subsidizes loss-making …rms, there is no increase in both default and, above all, systemic risk. Tables 8 and 9 , the expected default timing is shorter with = 0:4 (compare these results with those contained in Tables 2 and 3 ). This is not surprising since, with higher volatility, the probability that a …rm's EBIT reaches the default threshold level is higher. This means that, when the economic environment is more volatile, the probability of default is higher. However, we can see that an increase in F still delays default, thereby o¤setting the e¤ects of higher aggregate volatility.
As a robustness check, we have …nally analyzed the e¤ects of tax depreciation allowances when C is given: this exercise is necessary to see what happens when …rms cannot choose the optimal leverage, for various reasons. To sum up, if C is less than C , 21 the expected time of default is longer: this is due to the fact that a lower coupon entails a lower default threshold point (either e u or e s ). The converse is true when the inequality C > C . 22 Our results show that, in the cases examined (with C ? C ), an increase in F always causes a rise in E(T ).
Conclusion
In this article, we have studied the e¤ects of tax depreciation allowances on a representative …rm that can decide both when to invest and how much to borrow. The …rm is aware that, on the one hand, it can bene…t from generous depreciation allowances and, on the other hand, it may face default risk.
As expected, accelerated tax depreciation stimulates investment. Its effect on …nancial decision, however, is less easy to predict. This is due to the fact that tax tools (i.e. and F ) a¤ect not only a …rm's current payo¤, but also its contingent evaluation of future events (i.e., default and the project death). To analyze the impact of a stimulus pack on the capital structure we have thus used a numerical approach. As we have shown, generous tax depreciation allowances reduce the propensity to borrow and, in most cases, reduces default risk. In other words, an increase in F reduces both C and . This means that it is optimal to reduce the amount of debt and, at the same time, to invest earlier. The former e¤ect reduces the default risk, while the converse is true for the latter. Our results show that the former e¤ect dominates the latter and hence the expected default time is increasing in F . Similar results are obtained assuming higher volatility (i.e., = 0:4 instead of = 0:2). This means that, even when volatility increases (as happened during the Great Recession), the default risk is still decreasing in F . Therefore, we can state that a stimulus pack, characterized by higher tax depreciation allowances, does not lead to higher …nancial instability. 21 The inequality C < C may hold because of liquidity constraints or a troubled access to the credit market (i.e., small businesses may have di¢ culties in debt …nancing their activity). 22 The inequality C > C may hold when there are no credit constraints; however shareholders have no cash to raise equity. Of course, they could invite new shareholders to invest in their representative …rm. If however, the old shareholders feared this solution (which might reduce the …rm's control), they would prefer a higher leverage.
A The derivation of (6)
Solving (5) we obtain
< e j ;
(1 ) + C r+
where ( 1) + (r + ) = 0. As can be seen, the beforedefault value of equity consists of two terms: the perpetual rent, in square brackets, and 2 X i=1 A i i ( ) . Let us next calculate A 1 and A 2 . In the absence of any …nancial bubbles, A 1 is nil (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) . Therefore, setting A 1 = 0 we can rewrite (15) as E j ( ; C) = 0 after default, (1 ) + C r+ + I + A 2 i ( ) before default. (16) To calculate A 2 , we must note that when default occurs (i.e., when drops to e j ), we have E e j ; C = 0;
with e j = e s ; e u , since the …rm is expropriated by the lender (and equity is nil). Substituting (16) into (17) we …nd A. Rearranging then we obtain (6) .
B The derivation of (9)
Using (6) and di¤erentiating (8) gives the following f.o.c. 
Rearranging (18) gives (9) .
18
C An analysis of term e j 2 ( ) with j = s; u Using (7) and (9), it is easy to see that the inequality e u < e s holds. Applying the negative exponent 2 ( ) to this inequality gives e u 2 ( ) > e s 2 ( ) . This implies that, for any initial value of , the inequality always holds : Moreover, di¤erentiating the threshold points with respect to F gives: @ e s @ F = 1 I < 0;
@ e u @ F = 2 ( ) 2 ( ) 1 + r + 1 I < 0:
Given these results it is easy to see that @ e u @ F < @ e s @ F .
D The derivation of (10)
Using (4), applying Itô's Lemma and rearranging gives: (1 ) +
where terms
D i i ( ) measure the contingent value of future events after and before default, respectively. To calculate B 2 we use the boundary condition D j (0; C) = 0, which means that, when falls to zero, the lender's post-default claim is nil, and so we have B 2 = 0. In the absence of any …nancial bubble, we also have B 1 = D 1 = 0. To calculate D 2 we let the pre-default branch of (20) meet with its after-default one, net of the default cost C, at point = e j , with j = s; u, i.e., and substituting this solution into (20) we obtain (10) .
